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Outline
• Can we learn from past energy transitions & 
policies?
– The first & second British industrial 
revolutions
• Prospects and problems of a third, low-
carbon industrial revolution
– The challenges for low-carbon innovation
– General Purpose Technologies & the Sailing Ship 
Effect
– Relative prices and resources
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Research on Energy System Transitions
• Research on developing country and past & future UK 
transitions
• Long collaboration with Roger Fouquet (now C3B)
• Estimates for fuels, energy carriers & energy services, of
– Prices, consumption, expenditure
• Publications include:
• ‘One Thousand Years of Energy Use’ (En. Jnl.)
• ‘Five Centuries of Energy Prices’ (World Econs.)
• ‘Seven Centuries of Energy Services’ (Lighting) (En. Jnl.)
• Chapter: ‘Long Run CO2 Emissions & Environmental 
Kuznets Curves’
• Fouquet:  Heat, Power and Light: Revolutions in Energy 
Services, Edward Elgar (2008)
• Now engaged with the Transition Pathways to a low 
Carbon Economy consortium (EPSRC/E.ON)
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Data Sources
• Early centuries: data incomplete: broad trends only, so 
approach with caution
– Data mostly from Southern England
– Market town records (Rogers, 6 vols. 1865-86)
– Oxford & Cambridge Colleges, Eton & Westminster 
schools, hospitals, the Navy… (Beveridge, 1894)
– Several centuries of tax data
• National markets/transport developed gradually
• C18th national income data: ‘’controlled conjectures’ 
(Mokyr)
• C19th/20th: data range/quality grows
– Companies/local authorities
– Official enquiries (Parliamentary Papers – see website)
– Official government data series
Page 5
Britain’s 1st ‘Industrial Revolution’: C16th-
C19th Energy Transitions
• From a traditional agricultural economy, with limited
– Productivity of scarce land 
– For food, clothing, housing & energy flows
• To new regime: growth/ welfare transformed by using
– fossil stock (coal) for larger energy flows (Wrigley)
• With innovations including
• Steam engine
• Cotton mills & technologies
• Substitution of coal/coke for wood in metal manufacture
• Other social, political, institutional & technological changes 
• Which helped drive & were driven by mechanisation, 
urbanisation & Britain’s first ‘Industrial Revolution’
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Woodfuels
Coal
Fig.1a: UK Final Energy 
Consumption, 1500-1800 (TWh)
1650: equal 
shares of wood-
fuels & coal
Fouquet & Pearson (2003) World Economics, 4(3)
Coal use grew: 
woodfuel stable
The rise and fall of coal for final uses
Fig. 1b: UK Final Energy 
Consumption, 1800-2000 (TWh)
Depletion fears: 
Jevons, The Coal 
Question (1865)
1913: coal output 
& jobs peaked
Coal
Petrol
-eum
Gas
Elec
• Allen, 2009: why a British Industrial Revolution? Wages high 
relative to energy & capital costs, compared with other European 
& Asian  countries
• Innovations in steam engines & cotton mills & substitution of 
coal/coke for wood in metal manufacturing were uniquely 
profitable in Britain
Fouquet & Pearson (2003) World Economics, 4(3)
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Charcoal
Coal
Fig. 2: Real consumer fuel prices,1500-1800 (p/kWh)
Fouquet & Pearson (2003) World Economics, 4(3)
• Rising charcoal/ coal price differential around 1650-1750 
encouraged coal use
• Along with innovations in domestic & other uses of coal
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Energy price falling:
1550-1850
Energy intensity rising: 
1550-1850 
Fig. 3: Energy 
intensity & prices 
Inverse relationship 
between:
UK energy intensity 
(E/GDP)
and
Real energy prices 
(p/kWh)
Fouquet & Pearson (2003) World Economics, 4(3)
Substitution to costlier 
but ‘higher quality’ 
fuels
We created an ‘average price of energy’ 
series from estimates of individual fuel 
prices & expenditure weights
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Coal & New Steam Technologies in C18
• Engines pumped water from coal, copper & tin mines
• Savery’s patent (1698-1733), Newcomen’s 
‘atmospheric engine’ (1710-12)
• By 1733, 110 Newcomen engines in 7 countries
• Engines also linked to water wheels (rotary power)
• Watt’s separate condenser patent (1769-1800)
• raised efficiency & royalties (B & W defended their 
patent…)
• Watt, Murdoch (1782) et al. - rotary steam power; 
engines smaller & could drive machines
• By 1805: gas lighting in cotton mills (safer, cheaper; 
longer work day…)
• But only 2200 steam engines in mining & 
manufacturing by 1800
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Fig.4: Steam Engine Developments
• Thompson’s Atmospheric Beam 
Engine 
– Size of a house
– Ran 127 years, pumping 
water in Derbyshire coal 
mines (1791-1918)
• Bell Crank Engine (Rotary Power)
– Patented 1799 by William 
Murdoch
– 75 built by Boulton & Watt, 
1799-1819
– This one ran 120 years (1810-
1930)
• Both in Science Museum, London
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• High steam/water power price differential gradually 
overcome
– By steam’s mobility advantage
– More engine efficiency & control, from
• Higher pressure & compound boilers (Cornwall; Woolf, 
McNaught - 1840s); Corliss valves (1860s)
• Parity in power shares ca. 1830
• Steam let production move from water/ wind power 
sites
– Helped develop the factory system
– Especially textiles: e.g. Manchester - ‘Cottonopolis’
• Railways & then ships (niches first) & trade
– Developed national & international transport & markets
Long Run Perspective: Steam Power 
Development & Diffusion
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Fig 5: Sources of Power, 1760-1907 (shares/ total)
(L.h.s. axis: (R.h.s. axis:
% shares) total: 1000 hp)
Sources of Power, 1760-1907 (1000 hp)
Source: Kanefsky, 1979 (in Crafts 2004). Excludes animal/human power
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Why was the Industrial Revolution British?
Allen (2009): 
• British late C16-C18 trade success (wool textiles) => 
rural industrialisation & urban growth
• London’s growth (1500-1800: 15,000 – 1 million) => 
woodfuel shortage => relieved by exploiting relatively 
cheaper coal. Coal gave Britain cheap energy
• Responsive agriculture raised food supply & labour 
productivity =>freeing labour for manufactures
• City & manuf. growth => higher wages  & living 
standards (inc. diet: beef, beer & bread)
• Trade success also created UK’s high wage economy
• High wages & cheap energy (coal) => demand for 
technology to substitute capital & energy for labour
– Newcomen steam engines used more capital & coal to raise 
labour productivity
– Cotton mills used machines to raise labour productivity 
– New iron-making technologies substituted cheap coal for 
expensive charcoal & mechanisation raised output/ worker
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Fig. 6 : Price of labour relative to capital & 
energy in several countries (Allen, 2009)
Greater incentive to mechanise in 
Britain (ratio of building labourer’s 
wage to index of rental price of capital 
- PPP adjusted).
Intense incentive to substitute fuel for 
labour in Britain (ratio of building wage 
rate to energy price in key cities in 
Europe & Asia - cheapest fuel in each 
city). 
England
Strasbourg
Vienna
Page 15
Allen (2009), cont.
• The engineering challenges of these (inefficient) ‘macro-
inventions’ required ‘micro-inventions’ => growth of R & D, an 
important C18 business practice, supported by venture capital & 
use of patents to recoup development costs
• The high wage economy => demand for skills of literacy & 
numeracy &  gave parents income to purchase them => supplied 
Britain with skills needed for the ‘high-tech’ revolution
• The inventions were tailored to British conditions & for years were 
unprofitable in countries with lower wages & costlier energy
• But local learning eventually led to neutral technical progress => 
British engineers raised efficiency & reduced use of all inputs:
– E.g. steam engine coal consumption fell from 45 pounds/ 
horse power-hour in the early C18 to 2 pounds in the mid-C19
• By mid C19 the technologies could be profitably used in countries 
like France with expensive energy & India with cheap labour
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Fig. 7: Pumping Engine Efficiency,  1727-1852 -
Coal Consumption (Allen, 2009, 165)
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Energy Services: UK lighting experience
• The energy is for energy services
• illumination, transportation, cooked meals, 
refrigeration, comfortable temperatures…
• Evidence: extraordinary potential of innovation to
– Reduce costs, enhance quality & raise welfare
• Example: UK lighting services (1300-2000)
– Innovation in fuels & technologies, infrastructures & 
mass production, mostly post-1800, cut costs & 
improved access
– With rising incomes, led to ‘revolutions’ in light use & 
quality
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Fig. 8. UK Consumption of Gas, Kerosene & 
Candle Light (billion lumen-hours)
Gas 
light
Gas 
light
Candle light Kerosene
1800-1850 1850-1900
Fouquet & Pearson (2006) Energy Journal, Vol. 27(1)
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Fig. 9. UK Consumption of Kerosene, Gas & Electric 
Light, 1900-2000 (billion lumen-hours)
1900-1950 1930-2000
Electric 
light
Electric 
light
Gas light
Fouquet & Pearson (2006) Energy Journal, Vol. 27(1)
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Source: authors ’ own estimates – see Sections II.1.3 -5 and II.3
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Fig.10. UK Cost of Lighting from Gas, Kerosene & 
Electricity (£ per million lumen hours, 1800 2000)
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Fig. 11. UK Price Ratio of Lighting from Competing 
Energy Sources, 1820-1950
Ratio >1 
means new 
source costs 
more than old
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Fig. 12. UK Energy Service Transitions: Lighting – use of 
Candles, Gas, Kerosene & Electricity (1700-2000) 
By 2000: lighting costs fell to 1/3000 of 
1800 cost;  per cap. use rose 6500-fold
Electricity slow to match 
gas cost (1880-1920)
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Fig. 13a. Efficiency of UK energy 
technologies, 1500-2000
(index: 1900=100)
Fouquet & Pearson (2007), IAEE conference, Wellington
Fig. 13b. Cost of consumer 
energy services, 1500-2000
Fig. 13c. Energy services 
consumed, 1500-2000
Energy Service Indices
See also: Fouquet (2008), Heat, Power and Light, E. Elgar
•Substantial rises also  in efficiency & use 
for industrial power, transport & heat
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Long-Run Perspective on Energy System 
Transitions
• Energy systems are complex evolutionary 
entities, so transitions mean interactions between
– Fuels & energy converting technologies
– Infrastructures (transport networks, pipes & wires…)
– Institutions (markets, companies, finance…)
– Policy regimes (institutions, bureaux, regulations…)
– Economic variables (prices, income/output…)
– Environment & resources
– And people…
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A Long-Run Perspective on UK Transitions
• New technology diffusion took time
– Major productivity fx. of steam engines, locomotives & 
ships only observable after 1850 (Crafts…)
– Few steam-intensive industries
• 1800-1900: mining, textiles & metal manufactures 
accounted for >50% industrial steam power
• Not just steam: electric light slow to dominate gas 
(40 years: 1880-1920)
• Energy system inertia
– First mover advantage & path dependence?
• Mining & textile  industries 1st with steam but slow 
with electricity in 2nd C19 Industrial Revolution
• Relative to chemicals & engineering, shipbuilding & 
vehicles
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Fig.14: Turning over the Capital Stock takes Time…
• Thompson’s 
Atmospheric Beam 
Engine
– Ran for 127 years 
(1791-1918) in coal 
mines
• B & W Bell Crank 
Engine
– ran 120 years 
(1810-1930)
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Some Lessons from UK Energy Transitions 
• Transitions can have profound effects on economy, 
welfare & environment
• But Allen identified a combination of relative prices plus 
supply of cheap energy resources (coal) and physical, 
human & financial inputs as key conditions underlying the 
1st industrial revolution
• But took multiple decades for measurable growth effects of  
steam power to appear
• Evidence shows government can make a difference
• But past transitions weren’t managed
• Modern transitions could be faster – but still takes time
– To build new enthusiasm, infrastructure & institutions
– To escape the shackles of path dependence
– Overcome ‘lock-in’ & turn over old capital stock
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Challenges of Low Carbon Transitions
1. How to develop low carbon technologies & practices 
– what features should they have?
2. Adoption of these technologies & practices – do we 
pay enough attention to interactions between new & 
incumbent technologies
• These two questions lead towards
– Macro/Micro Inventions & GPTs
– The Sailing Ship Effect (SSE)/ Last Gasp Effect (LGE)
– The issue of pre-conditions, such as those identified by 
Allen in his analysis of why the 1st industrial revolution 
happened in Britain
– And the question, does the next industrial revolution have to 
happen in Britain
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The Future for Low Carbon Energy Systems?
• Two previous UK Industrial Revolutions were about 
manufacturing
– C18 revolution driven by textiles, iron & steam
– end C19 2nd revolution: electricity, chemicals, petroleum & mass 
production
• Improved technology (e.g. energy & ICT), might help break 
link between energy services, fuel demands & CO2 
emissions
– Energy & ICT e.g. in smart grids) as General Purpose Technologies
– Could enhance macro-level productivity
• A third and low carbon ‘Industrial Revolution’?
– But could be expensive & take time‘
– Remember, very few people enjoyed the fruits of the first Industrial 
Revolution until it was nearly over (Joel Mokyr’)’
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General Purpose Technologies
• Three key features:
– Pervasiveness: have a broad range of general 
applications/purposes
– Technological Dynamism: continuous innovation in the 
technology - costs fall/quality rises
– Innovational Complementarities: innovation in application 
sectors – users improve own technologies, find new uses
• The penetration of a GPT in an economy involves a long 
acclimatization phase
– In which other technologies, forms of organization, institutions & 
consumption patterns adapt to the new GPT
• Steam engines, ICE, electrification & ICT often given 
as examples
– raised productivity growth - but took decades
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Two Reviews: (i) Castaldi & Nuvolari (2003)
• Reviews GPT by applying it to 19th century 
steam power development 
• Economic  impact of stationary steam technology 
not significant until mid-19th century
• The GPT model has some limitations.
– Doesn’t capture the “local” aspect of accumulation of 
technological knowledge
– Doesn’t take into account the interdependency among 
different technological trajectories (because it focuses 
on one particular technology as opposed to 
“constellations of major technical innovations”). 
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Two Reviews: (ii) Edquist and Henrekson (2006)
• Explore the impact of the steam engine, electrification 
& ICT – on productivity growth
• Finds that major technological breakthroughs do 
affect aggregate productivity growth
– but slowly: 140 years for the steam engine, 40-50 years for 
electrification & ICT
• Each technological breakthrough offers a different 
lesson
• There is a complex interdependence between 
different technologies
– ICT presupposed an extensive electricity network
– Steam was used as a primary source for producing 
electricity.
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The hypothesis of the Sailing Ship Effect
• Hypothesis: the advent of a competing new technology may 
stimulate innovation in an incumbent technology
– for some mature technologies, in some circumstances 
• This ‘Sailing Ship effect’/ ‘Last Gasp Effect’ makes the 
incumbent technology more efficient & competitive
• Before being ultimately superseded by the successor 
technology
• Cited SSE/LGE examples include:
– Improvements in sailing ships after the late C19
introduction of the steam ship
– The response of gas lighting, via the Welsbach 
incandescent mantle, to the 1880s arrival of the 
incandescent lamp and Jablochkoff candle
– The response of carburettors to the introduction of 
electronic fuel ignition in the 1980s (Snow)
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Figure 15: Experience Curves & Financing Learning
Stern Review PV Modules
Source: Stern Review, Figure 16.6
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Fig.16
SSE/ 
Last 
Gasp
Effects?
?But what if the 
incumbent’s 
experience curve 
shifts downwards?
?Through 
SSE/LGE and/or 
fossil fuel prices?
?Bigger learning 
investment needed
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Potential Significance of the SSE Hypothesis 
for Lower Carbon Transitions & Policy
• Significantly increased (price/quality) competitiveness of 
incumbents, through SSEs & fossil fuel price shifts, could :
– Slow newcomers’ sales
– Delay their travel down experience curves
– As they chase incumbents’ shifting experience curves
– Slowing the transition by restraining penetration rates (McVeigh et 
al.)
– And raising policy costs via higher subsidies needed for 
competitive penetration
– While forecasts that don’t allow for SSEs could overestimate 
penetration
• So, appreciating SSEs/Last Gasps matters, where there are mature 
technologies and we seek radical innovation
• And suggests giving proper attention to dynamic interactions 
between new and incumbent technologies
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A Third, Low-Carbon ‘Industrial Revolution’?
• Getting there from here
– Means more than substituting a few low carbon technologies into existing 
uses & institutions
• Low carbon technologies need capacity:
• To be widely used & diffused
• For continuous innovation & cost reduction
• To change what we do with them & how
• Hence to be somewhat like General Purpose Technologies?
– E.g. ICT & energy combinations (like smart grids)
– But GPTs take time to develop
– May be slowed by path dependence, lock-in and Sailing Ship/Last Gasp Effects 
– So we need to be aware of and respond to interactions between new & incumbent 
technologies 
– GPTs are contested – empirically & theoretically
• Relative prices & resources
– If Allen’s (2009) messages about 1st industrial revolution hold for this revolution, 
where are the relative prices & physical,  human & financial resources needed for 
risky innovation? 
– Role of carbon prices here?
• But does the low carbon revolution have to start in Britain?
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Thank you!
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